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Abstract: The present article investigates the intellectual and discursive orien-
tation of the culture-critical essay West Infection by the twentieth century
Iranian writer Ǧalāl Āl-e Aḥmad (1923–1969). In doing so, it likewise discusses
the question of why this particular text was to have so deep and lasting an
effect in redirecting the sociocultural modernization debate among Iranian
intellectuals from a mainly developmentalist discourse to one about the issues
of authenticity and identity. While considering Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay as raising
a question of meaning – more specifically the question of human being’s
meaning in the face of dehumanization under the spell of technological
‘Westernization’ –, we critically examine, in the course of our study, former
interpretive approaches that define Āl-e Aḥmad’s text as reflecting influence on
the author of existentialist philosophy. At the same time, we also address
scholarly discussions of West Infection that regard it as a manifestation of
nativism or leftist anti-capitalism. Rather than trying, in our turn, to pin down
what Āl-e Aḥmad has to say to any given ideological or philosophical doctrine,
we attempt to understand the use by Āl-e Aḥmad, in his essay, of terms such as
‘authenticity’, ‘alienation’, ‘identity’ and ‘religion’ – some of which are highly
evocative of existentialism and of nativism indeed – as constitutive of a dis-
course that – for all the arguable influence on it of modern ideologies and
philosophies – deserves to be treated as a word in its own right in the debate
about Iran’s sociocultural situation.
Keywords: Iranian intellectuals, authenticity, existentialism, nativism,
Westernization, modernity, tradition, religion
Twentieth century Iranian authenticity discourse is one of the defining phenom-
ena of the intellectual counter culture against the official sociocultural
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orientation and practice of the Pahlavī era (1925–1979).1 It started in the early
1960s, and the intellectual boosting this debate was the writer Ǧalāl Āl-e Aḥmad
(1923–1969) by his seminal essay West Infection – Ġarbzadegī in the Persian
original2 –, which started to see the light in 1962.3
Given that Āl-e Aḥmad’s4 entire biography as a writer of a literary oeuvre
consisting of novels and short stories, author of essays, reviews and ethno-
graphic studies as well as a school teacher and some time political activist5
is marked by his concern for Iran’s sociocultural situation, Ġarbzadegī fits in
neatly with the overall theme of its author’s life and works.6 The essay
started its adventurous journey as a report Āl-e Aḥmad had prepared for
the Commission on the Aim of Iranian Education within the Ministry of
Education in 1961, but the commission, upon deliberation, decided not
to release it.7 Subsequently, after first publishing the first third of the
original version in the journal Ketāb-e Māh in 1962, which – as the author
held later – caused the enforced closure of the journal,8 Āl-e Aḥmad, in the
same year, released a thousand copies on his own.9 In 1963, he proceeded to
publish an extended version with another publishing house, which ended in
1 Boroujerdi 1996: 106, 112–113, 217; Mirsepassi 2000: 96–127; Nabavi 2003: 57–58; Vahdat
2000; Vahdat 2002: 113–127.
2 cf. ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 144–147; Boroujerdi 1996: 66, n.17, enumerates alternative translations
such as ‘West-struckness’, ‘Occidentosis’, ‘Plagued by the West’, ‘Western-mania’, ‘Euromania’,
‘Xenomenia’, ‘Westitis’, ‘Westamination’, ‘Westoxication’; he himself goes with ‘Westoxication’:
Boroujerdi 1996: 65–76; Gheissari 1998: 89, 179, ns. 100 and 101, in addition to these renderings,
mentions ‘Occidentitis’ and quotes Aḥmad Fardīd’s translation ‘dysiplexia’; Lenze 2008: 8 gives
the current German translations ‘vom Westen geschlagen [‚struck by the West’], ‘vom Westen
befallen’ [‘befallen by the West’] and ‘Verwestlichung’ [‘Westernization’], the last of which he
criticizes as to weak; Mirsepassi 2000: 97–114 and 2011: 33, 119–124 alternately uses
‘Westoxication’ and ‘Westoxification’; Nabavi 2003: 57–64 sticks to ‘Westoxication’; Seidel
2014: 59 suggests ‘Westomanie’ [‘Westomania’] and ‘Verwestlichung’ [‘Westernization’];
Vahdat 2000: 61 and 2002: 113–117, 186–191, referring to Aḥmad Fardīd, quotes ‘dysiplexia’
and mentions the various renderings as ‘Occidentosis’, ‘Westmania’ and ‘Westoxication’.
3 Boroujerdi 1996: 66–67; Dabashi 2008: 75–76; Gheissari 1998: 88; Ḫalīlī 2005: 59; Hanson
1983: 8; Hāšemī 2015: 148; Vahdat 2000: 55.
4 Clinton 1985: 745a–747b.
5 Clinton 1985: 744b.
6 A list of publications is provided in Clinton: 746b–747a.
7 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 15; Boroujerdi 1996: 66–67; Dabashi 2008: 76; Hāšemī 2015: 148; Lenze
2008: 118.
8 Gheissari 1998: 88 n. 96; Nabavi 2003: 60.
9 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 16; Dabashi 2008: 76; Nabavi 2003: 60, 60 n. 99 and 100, 157 n. 10.
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the seizure of the copies and the bankruptcy of the publisher.10 While, in
1964, the author had sent an enlarged and final version to Europe to get it
published by Iranian students there – which attempt failed –, it was the
penultimate version of the essay that had already been printed clandestinely
and, as Āl-e Aḥmad claims, without his initiative in Tehran and California.11
In Ġarbzadegī, Āl-e Aḥmad denounces the official intellectual and practical
culture of his day as a form of disease.12 Actually, the author, in the very first lines of
his essay, allegorically paraphrases the term ġarbzadegī itself as ‘being infected by
cholera’, as a ‘heatstroke’ or as the ‘destruction of wheat by June-bug’.13 It is on
account of this understanding by the author himself of the term and the phenom-
enon denoted by it that I have chosen, in this paper, to render the term as ‘West
infection’, whenever referring to the phenomenon it signifies, and to remain with
the Persian Ġarbzadegī, when quoting the title of the essay. More specifically, Āl-e
Aḥmad deals with the sociocultural crisis that he sees as resulting from the official
intellectual and practical culture of his day and that he calls West infection as a
form of dehumanization. This, from the outset, established the Iranian authenticity
discourse as a quest for the definition and the affirmation of the identity of ‘human’
against non-human concepts and forces.14
The concept of ‘human’ underlying the official Iranian discourse of the
time mainly derives from Enlightenment teachings championing the auton-
omy of the individual human subject grounded in ratio and from various
types of nineteenth century positivism.15 Positivist rationalism as well as
empiricism and scientism – the latter often in the form of a crossbreed
between positivism and Büchnerian biological materialism – in addition to
popularized versions of biological and social Darwinism underlay the mindset
of quite a number of late nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectuals,
many of whom were also reform thinkers and political activists.16 It was, in
fact, not least the intellectual and practical projects of reform thinkers and
activists that, from as early as the mid nineteenth century, introduced
10 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 16–17; Dabashi 2008: 76.
11 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 17; Dabashi 2008: 76; Wells 1982: 44–46.
12 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 21, 224.
13 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 21.
14 Boroujerdi 1996: 68–69, 106, 112–113, 217; Hāšemī 2015: 11–18; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011:
306–307; Mirsepassi 2000: 96–127; Nabavi 2003: 57–58; Vahdat: 113–127.
15 Atabaki/Zürcher 2004: 1–12; Chehabi/Martin 2010: 165–191; Gheissari 1998: 13–39;
Mirsepassi 2000: 55–64; Seidel 2012: 141; Seidel 2014: 31, 55–58; Vahdat 2002: 27–74.
16 Atabaki/Zürcher 2004: 4–5; Seidel 2014: 31; von Kügelgen 2017: 36.
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modern Western philosophy to the Iranian intellectual scene.17 One of them,
Mīrzā Fatḥ ʿAlī Āḫūndzāde (1812–1878),18 recognizing the proponents of
natural science – commonly referred to as atheist in the Islamic tradition –
as the sole bearers of truth,19 presents a purely materialist doctrine which, in
its application to human nature and society, branches off into Iranian nation-
alism coupled with anti-Arab racism.20 Many of Āḫūndzāde’s ideas were
taken up and developed further by another key thinker, Mīrzā Āqā Ḫān
Kermānī (1853–1896),21 who – even more than Āḫūndzāde – paved the way
for modern Western philosophy in Iran.22 Kermānī, in the name of a world
view based on evolutionism and materialism, identifies human body and
mind with physical and chemical processes23 and classifies humanity accord-
ing to nineteenth century racist phrenology.24 Religion, too, has to conform to
this paradigm of rationalism: In the view of some late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Iranian intellectuals, such as Kermānī, it can.25 In the view
of others, it can’t. A prime example of the latter attitude is the very
Āḫūndzāde, who holds that, if society is to become ‘civilized’, ‘science’ –
by which he understands thinking independent of revelation – has to replace
religion26 and who considers materialism as the esoteric meaning of certain –
most of them mystical – Islamic teachings.27
The privileged or even exclusive identification of truth and reality – includ-
ing those of human being – with ‘science’ and positivist rationality, forming, as
it did, the doctrinal background of many thinkers relevant to, or indeed active
in, the Iranian constitutional movement,28 started to directly affect Iran’s socio-
cultural development as early as the beginning of the twentieth century.
Following the advent of the Pahlavī regime after the demise of the constitutional
movement, many of the Western-inspired intellectual doctrines discussed above
continued to play a dominant role, albeit in a changing sociocultural and
political setting. As a case in point, it was very much on the basis of
17 Seidel 2014: 42–54.
18 Vahdat 2002: 42; von Kügelgen 2017: 49–54, 121–139.
19 Von Kügelgen 2017: 51.
20 Von Kügelgen 2017: 54, 135–136.
21 Born as ʿAbdolḥoseyn Ḫān. Vahdat 2002: 36; von Kügelgen 2017: 70–78, 202–207.
22 Von Kügelgen 2017: 54.
23 Vahdat 2002: 38; von Kügelgen 2017: 54, 75.
24 Vahdat 2002: 39.
25 Von Kügelgen 2017: 54, 67–99.
26 Von Kügelgen 2017: 52.
27 Von Kügelgen 2017: 51, 136.
28 Atabaki/Zürcher 2004: 1–12; Seidel: 55–57.
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modernization through Westernization, a principle already advocated by con-
stitutional and pre-constitutional thinkers and activists, that the Pahlavī rulers
carried out their reform projects from above, with a focus on the appropriation of
technology, science and education.29 In fact, it was the hope of many Iranian
intellectuals – some of whom, by the way, in the constitutional era had been
championing individual freedom – for the implementation of their vision of
positivist modernity that made them put up with, or even welcome, Pahlavī
autocracy.30 In the official discourse and practice throughout the Pahlavī era,
and in the dominant intellectual debate until as late as the end of the 1950s,31
the concept of positivism and rationalism – together with the concomitant
understanding of ‘human’ – tended to be further reduced to an instrumental
means-ends rationality, mainly in the form of industrialization, technocracy and
developmentalism,32 with many a progressive intellectual subscribing to histor-
ical determinism.33 Religion, in this mindset, figured as the antithesis to pro-
gress, rationality, scientific thought and development.34
It was not before the late 1950s that the theoretical validity of this discourse
came under questioning among ever wider circles of Iranian intellectuals.35 The
fact that this happened at all, and that it happened at that time, may be
attributable to a large degree to historical developments and events occurring
in the reign of Moḥammad Reżā Pahlavī (r. 1941–1979). Unlike his father, Reżā
Pahlavī, who, for all his despotism, was given some credit for being a dauntless
defender of national independence and a committed, if ruthless, champion of
modernization, Moḥammad Reżā was known to owe his very accession to the
throne to Western powers, mainly the US. His legitimacy took a further blow
when, in 1953, he was virtually reinstalled as ruler by a CIA-orchestrated coup,
ending the term of the democratically elected and nationalist government
headed by prime minister Moḥammad Moṣaddeq, who had attempted to natio-
nalize Iran’s oil industry.36 For many contemporary intellectuals, the Shah’s
behavior toward Moṣaddeq, coupled with his ever more obvious dependence
on the West in the wake of the CIA-coup, was a learning moment that in their
eyes discredited not only the ruler’s pretensions at Western-style modernization,
29 Seidel 2014: 57.
30 Gheissari 1998: 41; Vahdat 2002: 79.
31 Nabavi 2003: 34.
32 Nabavi 2003: 68–70; Vahdat 2002: 80.
33 Nabavi 2003: 34.
34 Nabavi 2003: 33.
35 Nabavi 2003: 34.
36 Boroujerdi 1996: 28; Nabavi 2003: 11.
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but Western modernity itself.37 The ensuing intellectual discussion increasingly
steered away from the issue of how best to introduce Western modernity to Iran,
turning to the question of the very desirability and meaningfulness of Western
modernity. Āl-e Aḥmad’s Ġarbzadegī, then, in this context, can be seen as the
most influential manifestation of, and contribution to, this debate.38
New though the dominance on intellectual discourse of this question was, it
deserves mention that the question itself had been raised before in Iranian
intellectual history. It was the Western-educated political and social scientist
and writer Ḥoseyn Kāẓemzāde (1884–1962), better known by his pen name
‘Īrānšahr’,39 who, for all his acknowledgment of the contribution of
Enlightenment thought to humanity, criticized Western modernity for its materi-
alism and spiritual alienation resulting, as he saw it, from gearing the rational
faculty toward the body – which, in Īrānšahr’s conceptual mind-body dichotomy,
is secondary in human beings – rather than toward the soul, which is primary.40
Iranian nationalism’s task, as envisaged by Īrānšahr, was to bring about a
civilization and a human being that would steer clear of these aberrations.41
Although Īrānšahr, in his later years, became aloof from the sociopolitical debate
of his native country, working instead as the leader of a theosophic circle in
Switzerland,42 his discourse on nationalism and his criticism of instrumental
rationality and materialism were taken up and developed along new lines by
Seyyed Aḥmad Kasravī (1890–1946).43
The point we choose to take up in this paper is that it is the understanding
of the identity of ‘human’ along the lines of a conceptually reduced positivism as
championed by the official discourse of the Pahlavī state and, for a long time,
prominent in the intellectual debate that Āl-e Aḥmad in his essay Ġarbzadegī
subjects to a damning critique, with the catchword he uses to denote this
process being ‘West infection’, which is also the title of his essay. But before
we embark on our discussion, we have to do justice to the fact that Āl-e Aḥmad’s
text, in the scholarly and non-scholarly debate surrounding it, has been dealt
with from a wide variety of interpretive angles.
One of them refers to Āl-e Aḥmad’s political orientation as an Iranian leftist.
And, indeed, Āl-e Aḥmad’s long-time career as a political activist is marked by his
37 Boroujerdi 1996: 31–32, 33; Nabavi 2003: 17–18.
38 Nabavi 2003: 34–36.
39 Vahdat 2002: 83–85.
40 Vahdat 2002: 84.
41 Vahdat 2002: 84–85.
42 Vahdat 2002: 83.
43 Vahdat 2002: 85–90.
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membership in varying, but always leftist, political organizations.44 Considering
this background, a number of scholars have interpreted Ġarbzadegī as a manifesta-
tion of its author’s professed leftism and anti-capitalism.45 Such views may seem
well founded, given that Āl-e Aḥmad’s criticism of Western civilization displayed in
his essay and elsewhere extends to Western capitalism. However, we should like-
wise bear inmind– andwe shall deal with this issue later on in our discussion ofĀl-
e Aḥmad’s essay – that Ġarbzadegī, however strong an anti-capitalist statement we
may see in it, is at least as outspoken against machinism or ‘mechanism’. And
machinism is a phenomenon Āl-e Aḥmad explicitly does not relate exclusively to
the capitalist West, but describes as a mode of being transcending all ideological
affiliations:
We no longer live in a time in which people in the ‘West’ are scared of ‘communism’ or, in
the ‘East’, of the bourgeoisie and of liberalism. Nowadays, even […] Khrushchev can buy
wheat from America. In our times, all those isms and ideologies are avenues leading to the
heavenly throne of ‘mechanism’46 and ‘machinism’.47,48
And, anyway, Āl-e Aḥmad’s anti-machinism emphasized in his essay could not
be put down to his leftist convictions alone. For mechanization and industriali-
zation are no strangers to leftist ideologies and policies, whereas Āl-e Aḥmad is
known to have broken away from several leftist organizations – most notably the
Tūde-party – on the grounds that – besides their uncritical devotion to the Soviet
Union – in their development programs aiming at industrializing Iran they failed
to respect Iranian culture.49 Moreover, the writing of Ġarbzadegī itself came at a
time when Āl-e Aḥmad, disillusioned with party politics anyway, from bitter
experience as a political activist had come to realize that leftist – and other
secular – ideologies failed to reach the very masses whose cause they claimed to
defend.50 Āl-e Aḥmad’s anti-capitalist statements in Ġarbzadegī, then, cannot be
accounted for by his leftist convictions, certainly not in an exclusive manner.
Another angle from which Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay is frequently approached
is nativism, a term introduced for the first time into scholarship, in 1943, by
the sociologist Ralph Linton and defined as ‘any conscious, organized
44 Boroujerdi 1996: 66; Dabashi 2008: 46–50; Lenze 2008: 20–26; Mirsepassi 2000: 101; Vahdat
2002: 113.
45 Dabashi 2008: 61–62; Nabavi: 35; Seidel 2014: 61.
46 Persian mekānīzm.
47 Persian māšīnī šodan.
48 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 25–26. All translations, if not referenced otherwise, are my own.
49 Boroujerdi 1996: 66; Dabashi 2008: 46–50; Lenze 2008: 21–26; Mirsepassi 2000: 101; Vahdat
2002: 109–113.
50 Dabashi 2008: 78.
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attempt on the part of a society’s members to revive or perpetuate selected
aspects of its culture.’51 We have to stress from the outset that it is scholars
dealing with Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay such as Mehrzad Boroujerdi52 and Franz
Lenze53 who have labeled it as ‘nativist’, while its author never refers to the
term. To be sure, in Ġarbzadegī ample evidence that seems to justify the
application of this denomination can be found. After all, it is Āl-e Aḥmad
himself who, in his essay, takes stock of what he perceives as Iran’s cultural
situation of his day by saying:
This essay is primarily about the fact that we have not managed to preserve our cultural-
historical identity54 in the face of the machine and its inevitable55 onslaught.56
And Āl-e Aḥmad’s text is replete with laments about the destruction of village
life and of traditional handicraft in the wake of the introduction of industrial
methods of production, the staggering growth of towns at the expense of rural
settlements and about the resulting socio-economic dislocation.57 Based on
references like these, some followers of a nativist interpretation of Āl-e
Aḥmad’s essay go so far as to attribute to the author ‘anti-Western nostalgia’,
‘romanticism of Iranian and Islamic traditions’,58 ‘romanticism of local cul-
tures’,59 ‘anti-modernization romanticism’60 and even a yearning for a paradise
lost61 and to describe Ġarbzadegī as a ‘eulogy of a passing era’.62 Interpreting
Ġarbzadegī in the light of nativism does have the advantage of accounting for
Āl-e Aḥmad’s displays, in his essay, of anticapitalism in a more convincing way
than attributing them to his political record as a leftist does. In particular, the
ongoing pervasion, in Āl-e Aḥmad’s time, of Iran by foreign capital would have
been deeply disturbing to a nativist. On the other hand, interpretations of Āl-e
Aḥmad’s essay from the angle of nativism only work on the implicit assumption
that the culture Āl-e Aḥmad, in the name of alleged nativism, consciously
51 Linton 1943: 230–231. Cf. Lenze 2008: 36–38.
52 Boroujerdi 1996.
53 Lenze 2008.
54 Persian šaḫṣiyyat.
55 Persian ǧabrī.
56 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 28.
57 Boroujerdi 1996: 70; Lenze 2008: 156–168; Mirsepassi 2000: 77–78; Mirsepassi 2011: 33–34;
Mirsepassi 2017: 51–52.
58 Mirsepassi 2000: 77.
59 Mirsepassi 2000: 78.
60 Mirsepassi 2000: 105.
61 Lenze 2008: 156.
62 Boroujerdi 1996: 68.
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attempts to revive or perpetuate is Iran’s pre-industrial past. We shall get back to
this point later in the paper.
Now, approaching, as we do, Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay as a critique of a reduced
concept of ‘human’ as a result of a likewise conceptually reduced positivism, we
may note that Āl-e Aḥmad takes issue with this process on two interconnected
counts: first, that the understanding of ‘human’ in the process of West infection
is reductionist; second, that that to which ‘human’ is reduced in this process is a
non-human principle. The catchword Āl-e Aḥmad uses for this non-human
principle is ‘machine’,63 as in the following quote where he says about the
situation of Iran as a country of the developing world:
The very fact alone [that we in the developing world are not producers, but mere con-
sumers of the machine] leaves us no choice but to fashion ourselves after the design of the
machine […], ourselves and our governments and our culture and our daily life.64
In another quote where he condemns militarism as yet another form of machin-
ism, Āl-e Aḥmad relates his concept of ‘machine’ to the doctrines that he regards
as its intellectual background:
[…] militarism […] basically learns its ways from the machine, from the machine that in
turn is the product of ‘pragmatism’, ‘scientism’ and ‘positivism’ and other isms of this
kind.65
Āl-e Aḥmad does not specify what he understands by the philosophical doc-
trines he mentions in the quote and what connection he supposes to hold
between them and the machine. His condemnation of the doctrines referred to
in the quote, however, goes to show as much that he is opposed to all of them.
Whether his opposition to them is itself grounded in any philosophy, and, if so,
in which one, is an issue hotly debated both among later intellectuals referring
to Āl-e Aḥmad and scholars dealing with him scientifically.66 Ali Gheissari, in
his reading of Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay, describes the author’s critique of Western
technology as reminiscent of a Marcusian criticism of positive science.67 Reading
Negin Nabavi’s Intellectuals and the State in Iran, in which she discusses Āl-e
Aḥmad mainly in the context of Iranian intellectuals’ relationship to the official
63 Persian māšīn.
64 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 27–28.
65 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 202.
66 Boroujerdi 1996: 68–71; Dabashi 2008: 74; Gheissari 1998: 88–90; Ḫalīlī 2005: 61–62;
Hanson 1983: 7–13; Hāšemī 2015: 155; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 302–306, 308; Mirsepassi 2011:
32–34, 119–124.
67 Gheissari 1998: 88–89.
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discourse and practice of the Pahlavī era, one might feel tempted to take Āl-e
Aḥmad’s rejection, in the quote, of scientism and positivism, the theoretical
substructure of technology, as a note of protest against technocratic policies
enacted without sensitivity to Iran’s cultural condition.68 Boroujerdi, viewing Āl-
e Aḥmad’s essay as an expression of nativism, presents Āl-e Aḥmad’s critique of
science and technology as grounded in the author’s conviction – allegedly
influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy of technology – that these are instruments
of human mastery as the essence of Western civilization.69 Boroujerdi’s view is
adopted by Reżā Ḫalīlī70 and, although not without qualification, by ʿAbbās
Manūčehrī and Moslem ʿAbbāsī.71 At the other end of the spectrum, Moḥammad
Manṣūr Hāšemī deplores a very lack of knowledge, in Āl-e Aḥmad, of
Heidegger’s thought about technology.72
Following up the issue of a potential philosophical grounding of Āl-e
Aḥmad’s above-quoted dismissive remarks about pragmatism, scientism and
positivism, we may take note that Āl-e Aḥmad’s reading background and his
translation projects do suggest a marked, but not exclusive, interest in some
major themes of existentialism, notably the problem of human subjectivity.73
And adherence to existentialism would certainly establish a strong counter
position to positivism and rationalism. Indeed, many recipients of Āl-e
Aḥmad, be they scholars or not, interpret his essay in the light of existentialist
philosophy.74 The impression of existentialist influence on the author seems to
be all the more justified when we learn that Āl-e Aḥmad, besides reading and
translating works by Sartre and Camus, was acquainted with the philosophy
teacher Aḥmad Fardīd (1912–1994),75 who was a member of the aforementioned
Commission on the Aim of Iranian Education76 and who is known as the first
Iranian Heideggerian.77 Fardīd’s lasting involvement with Martin Heidegger’s
68 Nabavi 2003: 68–70.
69 Boroujerdi 1996: 68.
70 Ḫalīlī 2005: 61–62.
71 Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 302–306.
72 Hāšemī 2015: 155.
73 Boroujerdi 1996: 69–70; Dabashi 2008: 57–58, 74; Ḫalīlī 2005: 58, 62; Hanson 1983: 8;
Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 308; Mirsepassi 2011: 120–121.
74 Boroujerdi 1996: 69–70; Dabashi 2008: 57–58; Hāšemī 2015: 163; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011:
308; Mirsepassi 2011: 120–121.
75 About life and works cf. ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014; Boroujerdi 1996: 63–65; Hāšemī 2015; Mazinani
2006–2007; Mirsepassi 2011: 30–43; Mirsepassi 2017.
76 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 16; Boroujerdi 1996: 67.
77 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 155–170; Boroujerdi 1996: 63–65; van den Bos 2005: 122; Hāšemī 2015:
82–87, 147–171; Mazinani 2007: 52–62, 78–82, 90–95; Mirsepassi 2011: 30–43; Vahdat 2002: 114–
115.
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(1889–1976) thought in turn goes back to his acquaintance with the French
philosopher and Orientalist Henry Corbin (1903–1978), who first introduced
Heidegger’s philosophy to the Iranian intellectual scene in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. That was the time when he started to work and live in Iran as a
researcher into Islamic mysticism and philosophy,78 using Heidegger’s phenom-
enology as a hermeneutic key to understanding Islamic mystical and philoso-
phical texts.79 As for Fardīd’s attraction to Heidegger, it seems largely motivated
by his conviction that Heidegger’s analysis of human being’s situation in the
world had the potential of a paradigm shift in understanding Iran’s cultural and
intellectual situation.80 It was Fardīd, too, who, as a keyword in the context of
his Heidegger-inspired critique of metaphysics, coined the term ‘West infec-
tion’,81 which Āl-e Aḥmad adopted from him, albeit in a sense different from
the one intended by Fardīd.82 The latter seems to understand the term as an
equivalent of what Heidegger refers to as forgetfulness of being, further drawing
on Heidegger to construe an ontological East-West dichotomy.83 In this, the
‘West’ figures as the home of rationalist ‘reality’ resulting in the forgetfulness
of being and the ‘East’ or ‘Islam’, for that matter, as the abode of ‘truth’, a truth
grounded in the mindfulness of being in the name of spirituality.84 In the
framework of this dichotomy, Fardīd goes on to combine Heidegger’s history
of beyng with the Islamic mystic Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) doctrine of
the divine names with each name constituting the manifestation of a new era in
the history of beyng.85 Added to this, we find a modified version of Aristotelian
hylomorphism with each preceding era in the history of beyng relating to the
subsequent one in terms of its matter and each subsequent one relating to the
preceding one in terms of its form.86 In Fardīd’s criticism of Iran’s sociocultural
situation, it is Heidegger’s critique of technology as the ultimate form of
78 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 69–71, 86–87; van den Bos 2005; Landolt 1999.
79 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 101–106; van den Bos 2005: 115, 118; Corbin 1981: 31; Landolt 1999: 488;
Seidel 2014: 62–63.
80 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 156–158, 266–268; Boroujerdi 1996: 63–65; van den Bos 2005: 122;
Gheissari 1998: 89; Mirsepassi 2011: 30–43; Seidel 2014: 60–61.
81 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 144–147; Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 16; Boroujerdi 1996: 65–76; Dabashi 2008:
76; Gheissari 1998: 89, 179 n. 101; Lenze 2008: 38–39; Mirsepassi 2000: 97–114; Mirsepassi
2011: 119–124; Nabavi 2003: 57–64; Seidel 2014: 60–61; Vahdat 2000: 61; Vahdat 2002:
113–117, 186–191.
82 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 144–147, 380–381; Gheissari 1998: 89; Hāšemī 2015: 104–108, 148–151;
Mirsepassi 2011: 119–124; Vahdat 2002: 114–115.
83 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 144–147; Hāšemī 2015: 104–108.
84 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 144–147; Hāšemī 2015: 75–76, 82–87.
85 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 133–144; Hāšemī 2015: 76–82, 87–89, 94–96.
86 Hāšemī 2015: 96–104.
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metaphysical thought under the spell of the forgetfulness of being and his
understanding of ‘authentic’ vs. ‘inauthentic’ being that figure prominently in
Fardīd’s adaptation of Heidegger’s philosophy.87 Āl-e Aḥmad, in his turn, cer-
tainly uses ‘West infection’ in his culture-critical essay to construct an East-West
dichotomy in sociocultural terms without, however, featuring Heideggerian
fundamental ontology and onto-history as drawn on by Fardīd – let alone the
latter’s inclusion of Ibn ʿArabī and Aristotle.88 Still, how much of implicit
Heideggerian or, for that matter, Fardīdian baggage we are justified to sense
behind Āl-e Aḥmad’s words, is again a divisive issue among scholars and non-
scholars dealing with Ġarbzadegī and a question we are going to touch upon in
the further course of this paper. As for now, suffice it to say that statements
affirming a doctrinal affiliation to Heidegger’s philosophy on the part of Āl-e
Aḥmad like the ones by Ali Mirsepassi to the effect that Āl-e Aḥmad uses the
term West infection in his criticism of consumerism, autocracy, poverty and
decline of religiosity in the sense of a Heideggerian notion89 or that it was
directly from Fardīd’s analysis of Heidegger that Āl-e Aḥmad derived and
developed his concept of West infection90 cannot be substantiated on the
basis of terminological borrowings from Fardīd by Āl-e Aḥmad.
Another point besides the aforesaid Āl-e Aḥmad-Fardīd connection that
has come to be interpreted as an indication of existentialist influence on Āl-e
Aḥmad is the author’s remark in the introduction to his essay that one of the
earliest readers of it, the philosopher and translator of works of Western
philosophy Maḥmūd Hūman (1909–1981),91 identified its message with that
of the German Ernst Jünger’s (1895–1998) essay Crossing the Line92 which
discusses nihilism and deals with certain themes of Heidegger’s thought.93
Notably, Jünger, in this text, building on his previous definition of technolo-
gical reality as nihilistic,94 reflects on how human being, in the face of
annihilation in the nihilistic maelstrom, can stay alive,95 and, as some
claim, it is Jünger’s diagnosis of technological modernity that had brought
87 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 266–268; Hāšemī 2015: 120–132.
88 Seidel 2014: 60–61.
89 Mirsepassi 2011: 39.
90 Mirsepassi 2011: 119.
91 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 15–16; Boroujerdi 1996: 145 n. 24, 198; Dabashi 2008: 76.
92 Common English translation of the German original Über die Linie (cf. Bibliography to this
article), in Persian ʿObūr az ḫaṭṭ: Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 15–16.
93 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 15–16; Dabashi 2008: 74, 76; for a comparative analysis of Jünger’s essay
with Heidegger’s philosophy see Figal 1995a and Figal 1995b.
94 Figal 1995a: 189.
95 Figal 1995a: 189.
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Heidegger to prominently address the question of technology in his oeuvre in
the first place.96 Āl-e Aḥmad, however, does not state any opinion of his own
with regard to Hūman’s judgement nor does he say on what grounds Hūman
regards Jünger’s and Āl-e Aḥmad’s message as the same, but simply goes on
to mention that, with the latter’s help, he embarked on translating Jünger’s
essay into Persian.97 Whatever we may think, then, about intellectual com-
mon ground between Jünger and Āl-e Aḥmad, the latter’s non-committal
remarks about Hūman’s comparison between Ġarbzadegī and Jünger’s
Crossing the Line make the judgment by Mirsepassi, who sees in Āl-e
Aḥmad’s essay a similar adherence to a philosophy of will at work as in
part of Jünger’s oeuvre,98 stand on its own merits.
On the other hand, specifically with regard to the essay Ġarbzadegī with its
emphasis on the machine, it would be tempting indeed to suggest an affinity to
Heidegger on the part of Āl-e Aḥmad given that Heidegger had focused on the
question of technology in texts that had appeared in the years before the
publication of Ġarbzadegī.99 But then, again, it is in the context of a lengthy
passage on the nature of the machine in Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay that we come
across the remark
[…] the machine is a means, not a goal.100
Now, the concept of the machine as a means is manifestly not the idea
underlying Heidegger’s thought about technology,101 and this consideration
should be enough to warn us against trying to pin down Āl-e Aḥmad’s
message to some particular philosophy. This caution is especially recom-
mended when, in oft-quoted secondary sources on twentieth century
Iranian intellectuals, we come across statements like the one by Boroujerdi,
who accuses Āl-e Aḥmad, in his criticism of machines, of ‘parroting of
Heidegger’102 and, elsewhere in his discussion of Ġarbzadegī, gives the
impression, unsubstantiated by any textual reference in Āl-e Aḥmad’s
works, that Heidegger’s thought that, as Boroujerdi phrases it, ‘technological
96 Figal 1995a: 185–186.
97 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 16; Dabashi 2008: 74, 76; Ḫalīlī 2005: 58.
98 Mirsepassi 2000: 109.
99 E. g. Heidegger: 1954, 1960, 1977 (1935/36), 1997 (1938/39), 2000 (1959), 2007 (1962);
Boroujerdi 1996: 68, 70; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 302–303; Mirsepassi 2011: 95.
100 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 119.
101 Borgmann 2005: 428–429; Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 62; Hāšemī 2015: 155; Heidegger 1954:
9; Luckner 2008: 93–94; Manūčehrī/ʿAbbāsī 2011: 302–303.
102 Boroujerdi 1996: 71.
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development was to be viewed not as a mere instrument but as a mode of
thought’ is in fact the position expressed by Āl-e Aḥmad himself.103 Similar
reservation is advisable when approaching Hamid Dabashi’s claim, based on
no textual evidence in Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay, to the effect that the author
‘verified the validity of his own observation […] on its proximity to […]
Ernst Jünger.’104 The same goes for remarks by Mirsepassi, who declares Āl-
e Aḥmad, prior to his turn to Islam, a Sartrean existentialist105 and, elsewhere
in his discussion of Āl-e Aḥmad’s intellectual orientation, mistakes Maḥmūd
Hūman’s allegation of similarity between Āl-e Aḥmad’s Ġarbzadegī and
Jünger’s Crossing the Line for Āl-e Aḥmad’s own words – notwithstanding
the fact that Āl-e Aḥmad in his text marks out this observation as Hūman’s
by introducing it with the phrase ‘in his [i. e. Hūman’s] words’ -106 and
accordingly construes the statement as an acknowledgment of intellectual
indebtedness to Ernst Jünger on the part of Āl-e Aḥmad.107
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in the concluding chapter of his essay,
Āl-e Aḥmad, in order to sum up its overall message, refers to literary works by
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and Albert Camus (1913–1960), two central figures
of French existentialism, as well as to Eugène Ionesco (1909–1994) and Ingmar
Bergman (1918–2007),108 both of whom likewise prominently address the ques-
tion of the meaning of human existence. The work by Camus that Āl-e Aḥmad
singles out for discussion is The Plague which, as he remarks, he embarked on
translating in order to better grasp its message.109 He specifically deals with the
way the plague affects the behavior of the characters in the story, rounding off
his observations in the remark that
[…] the impact of the plague does not move anyone from the course he has been following
so far, but, quite on the contrary, makes him move on it ever faster.110
As his subsequent remark goes to show, this is the same kind of self-destructive
obsession under the spell of disease that he attributes to Iranians befallen by
West infection – likewise a contagious disease, and a disease, by the way, which
Āl-e Aḥmad, in the opening lines of his essay, compares to cholera:
103 Boroujerdi 1996: 70.
104 Dabashi 2008: 74.
105 Mirsepassi 2011: 120.
106 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 15.
107 Mirsepassi 2011: 121. Similar reservations apply to Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 62, who
uncritically repeat Boroujerdi’s above-quoted statement.
108 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 223–227.
109 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 224.
110 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 224.
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The same applies to us who are involved in the plague of West infection with the pulse of
our decay throbbing faster and faster.111
And Āl-e Aḥmad relates what he regards as the overall message of The Plague
even more clearly and succinctly to the theme of his own essay when, in the
same context, he concludes:
I saw that the ‘plague’, in Albert Camus’ opinion, is ‘machinism’.112
Now, ‘machinism’, as we have seen, is that non-human principle West infected
man, in Āl-e Aḥmad’s opinion, is reduced to, and, indeed, the author himself, in
what immediately follows the previous quote, straightforwardly refers to
machinism as
this killer of all beauty, poetry, humanness and Heaven.113
The other literary work Āl-e Aḥmad subjects to a more detailed analysis in
his concluding chapter is the play Rhinoceros by Ionesco. Just as he equated
the plague in Camus’ novel with West infection on the grounds of both
being a disease, in the case of Ionesco’s play he refers to the metamorphosis
of man into a rhinoceros as a disease similar to West infection on the
grounds that
[…] our dear fellow citizens are likewise […] day by day about to become a rhinoceros,
which is the last chance of resistance against the machine,114
again making the point that, for humans, staying human is no mode of being
compatible with the machine. Āl-e Aḥmad reiterates this point when, again
referring to Ionesco’s play, he says:
[…] if mankind does not want to be crushed under the foot of the machine, it clearly has no
choice but to transform into a rhinoceros.115
It is a similar conclusion Āl-e Aḥmad draws from his discussion of Bergman’s
movie The Seventh Seal, when, obviously having in mind the major theme of
the film, the silence of God, he remarks:
111 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 224.
112 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 224–225.
113 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 225.
114 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 225.
115 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 227.
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Once the age of belief has come to an end, the era of empiricism116 begins. And empiricism,
in turn, leads to the atomic bomb. This is what Bergman hints at, or, at least, my under-
standing of what he hints at.117
As far as these references go, it appears that, in order to explain what moved
Āl-e Aḥmad to write Ġarbzadegī, we need not resort to declaring him an
existentialist, certainly not in terms of doctrinal affiliation in any strict sense.
Rather, it seems that Āl-e Aḥmad, in Ġarbzadegī, draws on works by exis-
tentialist authors where he feels that his own, more particular, concern about
the dehumanization of the human being in a West infected society can
benefit from being related to what he knows of existentialism, whose more
general question is about man’s situation in the world. This conclusion, it is
true, runs counter to findings arrived at by other scholars dealing with Āl-e
Aḥmad’s essay such as Mirsepassi’s interpretation of Ġarbzadegī as being
suffused by a Heideggerian historicist reading and by a likewise Heideggerian
critique of technological nihilism.118 Even if we leave aside the question of
how justified these remarks, taken individually, may be, they are tacitly
based on an unwarranted presupposition, namely, that what underlies Āl-e
Aḥmad’s text is a systematic awareness and appropriation of Heideggerian
or – more broadly – of existentialist philosophy.
That said, given the strong emphasis by existentialist philosophy on the
question of meaning or meaningfulness, we may feel tempted to identify a more
specific affinity to existentialist teachings in Āl-e Aḥmad where he portrays West
infection as a loss of meaning and as a form of inauthenticity, when, e. g., he
says about West infected man:
West infected man has no personality.119 He is a thing without authenticity.120 He himself,
his house and what he says do not smell of anything, but he rather is a mere representa-
tion of anything121 and anyone.122,123
Presented with the term ‘authenticity’ in the above context, when assessing the
possible influence on Āl-e Aḥmad of existentialism we cannot refrain from
taking note that it is a key word of existentialist philosophy, notably in
116 Persian taǧrobe.
117 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 227.
118 Mirsepassi 2011: 122.
119 Persian šaḫṣiyyat.
120 Persian bī-eṣālat.
121 Persian hame čīz.
122 Persian hame kas.
123 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 146; cf. also Boroujerdi 1996: 68; Mirsepassi 2011: 100.
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Heidegger’s analytic of human being or – in his terminology – Dasein.124 Taken
as a non-evaluative term, it points up Dasein’s ontologically unique, first-person
relation to itself in terms of a point of view irreducible to any second or third-
person point of view.125 Heidegger stresses the essential irreducibility to any
second or third-person point of view of the first-person point of view in Dasein’s
relation to itself in opposition to doctrines, such as Descartes’ and Kant’s,126
that, in his view, assimilate the reflexive, non-observational structure of our self-
understanding to the kind of presence a thing – including human being as a
‘thinking thing’, as defined by Descartes – has when we encounter it in an
attitude of observation.127 Applying this latter, observational point of view to our
self-understanding is for Heidegger ‘inauthentic’. In addition to this authentic-
inauthentic dichotomy, however, Heidegger, in his analytic of Dasein, makes
room for yet another mode of self-understanding, which takes place in Dasein’s
average everydayness. In it, Dasein in its self-understanding is neither consis-
tently adhering to the non-observational, first-person point of view nor to an
observational third-person point of view, but – typically in accordance with the
situational requirements in its everyday world – switching between first, second
and third-person points of view in a rather undifferentiated manner. Heidegger
calls this mode of self-understanding the modal indifference of ‘the one’.128
Now, notwithstanding Heidegger’s insistence on the contrary, one cannot get
rid of the feeling that, in certain contexts, he, on the one hand, uses ‘authentic’
and ‘inauthentic’ in an evaluative sense in which ‘authentic’ describes a mode of
existence more choice-worthy than ‘inauthentic’129 and, on the other, assimilates
modally indifferent average everydayness to inauthenticity.130 If, then, we are at
all allowed to relate the term ‘authenticity’ and Āl-e Aḥmad’s depiction, in the
above quote, of West infected man as a representation of ‘anyone’ to such
existentialist understandings of human being, we certainly have to take the
inauthenticity referred to in it in the evaluative sense and, likewise, to assimilate
West infected man’s existence as a representation of ‘anyone’ in the sense of the
existentialist modal indifference of ‘the one’ to inauthenticity in the evaluative
understanding. In the mode of ‘the one’, according to Heidegger, ‘everybody is
the other, nobody is himself’.131 One could object, here, that Āl-e Aḥmad,
124 Carman 2005.
125 Carman 2005: 285, 290.
126 Carman 2005: 289.
127 Carman 2005: 290.
128 Carman 2005: 295. ‘The one’ translates the German ‘[das] man’.
129 Carman 2005: 286.
130 Carman 2005: 293.
131 Heidegger 2001: 128.
Negotiating the Relationship Human 733
portraying, as he does, West infected man as having no personality, does not
even affirm of him a ‘self’ in the first place, so that there can be no question of
relating Heidegger’s statement, which speaks of a ‘him-self’, to what Āl-e Aḥmad
has in mind when he comes up with the term ‘authenticity’. Neither does
Heidegger’s notion of inauthenticity, however evaluative it may be, imply assim-
ilating human being to a ‘thing’, as Āl-e Aḥmad does. To counter the objection
by simply declaring Āl-e Aḥmad’s description of West infected man as having no
personality and his assimilation of him to a thing as hyperbolic renderings of
West infected man’s inauthenticity in the existentialist sense would be a cheap
argument and end up in a moot point. At a less speculative level, it looks safer to
regard Āl-e Aḥmad’s remark about West infected man having no personality as
meaning the same as his assimilating him to a thing, for the obvious reason that
a thing, being not a person, naturally has no personality. This interpretation
would bring us close to our conclusion drawn from the earlier quote about man
transforming into a rhinoceros to the effect that, in a West infected culture,
being human is no option for human being. That said, although we need not –
or even must not – sense existentialist deep structure underlying Āl-e Aḥmad’s
use of ‘authenticity’ here, in consideration of another quote from Ġarbzadegī
that we shall discuss shortly we should likewise beware of rashly dismissing Āl-
e Aḥmad’s bringing up this term as simply one more example for the inflationary
occurrence of ‘authenticity’ in colloquial speech.
As already mentioned, that ‘thing without authenticity’ to which, according
to Āl-e Aḥmad, humans are reduced under the impact of West infection is the
machine:
[…] enforcing conformism on people is itself but one more necessary result of the machine,
its cause and effect at the same time. Uniformity in the face of the machine, conformism in
the factory, punctuality and doing the same kind of tedious job for a lifetime become a
second habit for all men who deal with the machine.132
It is this reduction of humans to the non-human principle of the machine as a
thing without authenticity that in turn spells meaninglessness. And meaningless-
ness in Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay is not merely to be understood as relative mean-
inglessness in the mere sense of the powerlessness of man in the face of the
machine and the technological age. It is rather to be understood as a mean-
inglessness of the human being in absolute terms in the sense of meaninglessness
itself becoming human being’s very mode of being. Āl-e Aḥmad, even invoking
Charlie Chaplin’sModern Times in the course of his argument,133 takes the point of
132 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 201.
133 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 201–202.
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this quote still further by linking – as he does in an earlier quote – machinism to
militarism in the sense that military service in a machine infected culture implies
the same conformism of man as his service of the machine.134
It is in the same vein as the previous quote that Āl-e Aḥmad, commenting on
the latest developments in space travel, makes the point that
they are […] the ultimate encroachment of the machine upon the sphere of humanness.135
and
[…] in this heavenly journey [of space travel], dogs and monkeys are superior to this
reduced mankind. […] by expending such human sacrifices, the machine is producing
humans of a new kind, as obedient as farm animals, which means that it strips humanity
of all dignity.136
This understanding of meaninglessness as resulting from reducing man to some
non-human essence, in this instance the machine, may be taken as reminiscent of
the position of existentialist philosophy which deals with the world through the
paradigm of meaning and understanding vis-à-vis ontologies promoting an object
cognition paradigm like positivism and scientism, which Āl-e Aḥmad condemns in
an earlier quote.137 In this context, the production of humans of a new kind – ‘new’
in the sense of being reduced to a non-human essence like the machine – would
only constitute one more example of the reduction of humans to a positivistically
defined essence. Whereas in doctrines like positivism and scientism – and even
more so in positivist means-ends rationality – such essentialization of the human
is valued as grasping and realizing the reality of the human, in the understanding
paradigm of existentialism such essentialization is considered the manifestation of
an inauthentic mode of perception forever failing to get to the reality of the human
and, therefore, making the human into something unreal. West infected man, from
this perspective, then, can be seen as an extreme case of an unreal human138:
West infected man […] is a thing with no ties to the past or any grasp of the future. He is
not a point on the line, but a hypothetical point on a page or rather in the void […].139
and
134 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 201.
135 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 211.
136 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 212.
137 Sheehan 2005: 205.
138 cf. also Vahdat 2000: 62.
139 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 141.
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West infected man is a follower of whatsoeverness. He is without belief in anything. But he
is without unbelief in anything, too. […] Nothing matters to him. […] He has no faith, no
principle, no goal, no conviction either in God or in man. He is not even unreligious. He is
a whatsoever man. Sometimes, he even goes to the mosque, just the way he goes to the
club or to the cinema. But wherever he goes, he is no more than a spectator, just as if he
has gone to watch a soccer game. […] He never commits himself.140
and likewise
[West infected man] is nowhere. […] He is an amalgam of an isolated existence without
personality and of a personality devoid of properties.141
The essentialization of the human under the impact of West infection, then,
since it dehumanizes humans, does not signify empowerment of an auton-
omous human subject, but rather its reduction to something non-human
and, therefore, less-than-human in the sense of a mere object of some non-
human power.142 In this context, it deserves attention that existentialist
doctrines, which advocate an understanding and meaning paradigm rather
than an object cognition paradigm, come to play an important role in the
Iranian authenticity debate.143 This may be because philosophies champion-
ing the meaning question look better suited to deal with issues of authen-
ticity and identity since both issues are intimately connected with the
meaning issue.
Interestingly, in his essay, Āl-e Aḥmad describes West infection as an
historical process affecting both East and West. When he mentions the phenom-
ena that he subsumes under the catchwords ‘West infection’ or ‘machine’
respectively, he often refers not only to Iran, but to the West as well.144 The
following quotes bear witness to this:
[…] parties in a democratic Western society are platforms for the gratification of the whims
of unbalanced and psychopathic human beings who, being brought in line at the machine
on a daily basis and forced to get up on time and to arrive at work on time and to catch the
tramway, have lost every chance to display individual will in any way.145
and
140 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 144.
141 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 146.
142 cf. Vahdat 2000: 56.
143 ʿAbdolkarīmī 2014: 266–268; Boroujerdi 1996: 63–65, 69–71; Hāšemī 2015: 11–18; Mirsepassi
2011: 28–43, 85–128; Vahdat 2002: 114–117.
144 cf. also Mirsepassi 2011: 120–121.
145 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 203.
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[…] as long as we [Iranians] are only consumers, as long as we do not produce the
machine, we are West infected. And what is even more beautiful is that once we do
produce the machine, we will be machine infected exactly like the West, whose lament
about the unruliness of ‘technology’ and the machine is for everyone to hear.146
Intriguingly, at this very point of his argument, Āl-e Aḥmad, in a footnote
consisting of no more than a source citation, refers the reader to the essay La
France contre les robots by Georges Bernanos, French writer and one of the main
representatives of the so called catholic renewal – to a text, that is, which
contains a scathing indictment of industrialization and machinism as transfig-
uring the very thinking of humans and threatening French civilization. The fact
alone that Āl-e Aḥmad refers to Bernanos’ text allows us to assume as much
that, before completing Ġarbzadegī, he knew about the issues discussed in it.
This makes us wonder all the more why he does not become more specific about
what actual parallels he sees between Bernanos’ essay and his own, precisely
considering that even the above outline of Bernanos’ message is suggestive of
striking similarities to Āl-e Aḥmad’s. Anticipating a point to be discussed later in
this paper, we may add as a further similarity both Bernanos’ and Āl-e Aḥmad’s
critical attitude toward the religious establishment – catholic and Muslim
respectively – of their day on the one hand, while, on the other, advocating
non-establishment religiosity as a remedy against machinism and West infec-
tion. Anyway, while, whatever parallels readers may feel justified to draw
between Āl-e Aḥmad’s Ġarbzadegī and Ernst Jünger’s Crossing the Line, these
cannot be accounted for by any influence on Āl-e Aḥmad of Jünger – for reasons
we have discussed earlier –, Bernanos’ La France contre les robots does qualify
for being at least considered as a source of inspiration for Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay.
It is the very lament formulated in the preceding quote that, as Āl-e Aḥmad
sees it, is voiced by all those Western authors he refers to in the final chapter of
his essay:
And I see that the ending of all these stories amounts to the threat of the final hour that, by
the hand of the demon of the machine (if we do not control it and put its spirit back into
the bottle), the hydrogene bomb has been planted at the end of the road of mankind.147
Both East and West, then, are West infected, both are mere objects of the
machine. The particular predicament of the East in this scenario, according to
Āl-e Aḥmad, is that the East, in addition to being the object of the machine, is
the object of the West, too. What makes the East an object of the West is the fact
146 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 29.
147 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 227.
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that it is a mere consumer of machines whereas the West is a producer.148
Actually, what, in the final analysis, defines ‘the East’ in Āl-e Aḥmad’s termi-
nology and sets it apart from ‘the West’ is not geography, but being affected by
that compounded predicament in the aforementioned sense.149
If we take Āl-e Aḥmad’s latest quotes as his last word on the future in a
machine infected world, the outlook would be bleak indeed. But, according to
Āl-e Aḥmad, there is hope for humans to preserve or regain their identity as
humans even in the face of the machine. The author makes it clear, however,
that this can, and need, not be achieved by abolishing the machine:
This is not about denying the machine as a fact or about abolishing it such as was the idea
of the utopians at the beginning of the 19th century. By no means. The fact that the
machine rules the world constitutes an historical necessity. It is about how to deal with the
machine and technology.150
And, anyway, Āl-e Aḥmad leaves it no doubt that he is far from glorifying Iran’s
pre-industrial way of life as some sort of good old times worth hankering after,
but instead holds that, if only the machine was introduced according to a
carefully thought up program, it could be beneficial
[…] so that all these eyes and hands and chests of the young villagers no longer be ruined
at the carpet weaving loom in order to embellish the homes of the fine lords and ladies.151
These quotes as well as the next one have much potential to declare case closed
on any understanding of Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay as an expression of ‘anti-Western
nostalgia’,152 ‘anti-modernization romanticism’,153 ‘romanticism of Iranian tradi-
tion’ or of ‘local cultures’,154 as suggested by Mirsepassi, and likewise on
Boroujerdi’s statements that ‘Al-e Ahmad […] was willingly oblivious to the
reality that […] machines also curtailed workers’ hardships […]’155 and that ‘in
the entire Gharbzadegi essay no mention is made of the positive results of
technology’.156 That Ġarbzadegī, then, has not been intended as a nativist’s
148 Boroujerdi 1996: 70; Hāšemī 2015: 155.
149 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 21–22, 23–24; Hāšemī 2015: 150–151;
150 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 27; cf. also Boroujerdi 1996: 70; Hanson 1983: 11; Mirsepassi 2011:
123–124; Vahdat 2002: 116–117.
151 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 100.
152 Mirsepassi 2000: 77.
153 Mirsepassi 2000: 105.
154 Mirsepassi 2000: 77, 78.
155 Boroujerdi 1996: 70.
156 Boroujerdi 1996: 71.
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appeal to revive past traditions or to return to a premodern Iran can in fact also
be borne out by referring to the contributions of Nabavi157 and Vahdat.158 Rather,
what Āl-e Aḥmad condemns as West infection, is not the machine as such, but
an inverted – or, in fact, perverted – relationship between the machine and
human being, a relationship in which human being, instead of appropriating the
machine, becomes itself – down to it very essence – appropriated by the
machine. Āl-e Aḥmad, it is true, is not consistent in his terminology, using, as
he does, the word ‘machine’, at times, in the sense of ‘technical device’ and, at
others, as synonymous with ‘machinism’ or, indeed, with ‘West infection’.
Understood as a technical device, ‘machine’, according to Āl-e Aḥmad, is a
means at the service of human being; conceived of as ‘machinism’ or ‘West
infection’, it is an inauthentic mode of existence for human being. This is
another point where we may be allowed to discern a difference between
Heidegger and Āl-e Aḥmad in their approach to technology: For Heidegger,
there can be no question of understanding technology or the machine, for that
matter, other than in terms of an inauthentic mode of being for humans result-
ing from a likewise inauthentic understanding of Being under the spell of
metaphysics. To conceive of ‘machine’ as a means, even if this understanding
runs parallel to a concept of the machine in terms of an inauthentic mode of
being, as is the case in Āl-e Aḥmad, as far as Heidegger is concerned would
amount to blatantly ignoring the essence of technology as not being anything
technological at all.159 Rather, for Heidegger, technology is the truth of a
particular epoch, i. e. of our time.160 For Āl-e Aḥmad, however, technology or
‘the machine’ in the sense of West infection are the situational reality of our
time, but not the truth of our time – in fact, not a truth at all, but rather the
distortion of the truth: The ‘truth’, for him, is the fact that, as he says, the
machine is a means at the service of human beings, and this ‘true’ relationship
between machine and human being, as he sees it, has been upset or turned
upside down by human being having become subservient to the machine. Both
Heidegger and Āl-e Aḥmad, however, in order to revise human being’s relation-
ship to technology, are far from advocating the negation or abolishment of
technology or the machine. Heidegger hopes for a shift in epochal truth itself,
truth not in the formal sense of truth conditions, but in the substantive sense of
what is eminently and decisively true of a particular time.161 Āl-e Aḥmad hopes
157 Nabavi 2003: 62.
158 Vahdat 2002: 115.
159 Heidegger 2007: 5.
160 Borgmann 2005: 424.
161 Borgmann 2005: 424.
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for the rise, within our epoch, of not (yet) – or less – West infected human beings
to change reality by restoring the ‘true’ relationship between human being and
the machine.162
Now, this ‘true’ relationship, as the author of Ġarbzadegī has said in one of
the previous quotes, consists in the machine being a means for a goal, not a goal
in itself, and, in the continuation of that same quote, Āl-e Aḥmad also states
what goal it is that this means should serve:
The goal is to remove poverty and to make material and spiritual welfare accessible to all
people.163
This is definitely a human goal. But precisely because it is a human goal, it only
makes sense if we first define human identity and preserve humanness.
Regarding this point, Āl-e Aḥmad has clear ideas of what, at least as far
as Iranian culture is concerned, constitutes human identity: It is Shii reli-
gion.164 It is in this spirit that the author of Ġarbzadegī bemoans the execu-
tion of the Shii cleric Šeyḫ Fażlollāh Nūrī (1843–1909),165 who, in the Iranian
Constitutional Revolution of 1906,166 championed the rule of Islamic religious
law, favorably setting him apart from intellectuals of his time whom he
regards as too secular-minded like Mīrzā Malkom Ḫān (1833–1908)167 and
Mīrzā ʿAbdorraḥīm Ṭālebūf (1832–1910)168 and seeing his execution by hang-
ing as the writing on the wall that signaled Iran’s ultimate immersion into
West infection:
[…] the martyred Šeyḫ Nūrī […] was ordered to be hanged as a defender of the rule of
religious law and, as I want to add, as a defender of the universality of Shii Islam. […] And
this happened at the very time when the leaders of our West infected intellectuals were the
Christian Malkom Ḫān and the Caucasian social democrat Ṭālebūf! Whatever the case may
be, it was from that day that our forehead has been virtually branded with the stigma of
West infection. And I see the body of that great figure dangling from the gallows like a flag
162 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 213–217.
163 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 119; cf. also Hāšemī 2015: 166.
164 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 77–78; Boroujerdi 1996: 72–73, 75–76; Dabashi 2008: 79, 80–86;
Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 60, 76–78, 79–80; Gheissari 1998: 89–90; Ḫalīlī 2005: 73, 81–83;
Hanson 1983: 12; Mirsepassi 2011: 121–124; Nabavi 2003: 100–106, 128–136; Vahdat 2002: 120–
121.
165 Dabashi 2008: 85, 233, 494; Gheissari 2016: 35; Matin 2016: 90–91; Odabaei 2016: 111–112;
Vahdat 2002: 65–68.
166 Ansari 2016; Gronke 2006: 92–95; Martin 1989.
167 Gheissari 1998: 24, 27–28; Vahdat 2002: 30–36.
168 Gheissari 1998: 15, 24, 126 n. 14; Vahdat 2002: 48–54.
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that was hoisted on the rooftop of our homeland as a token of the conquest by West
infection.169
And Āl-e Aḥmad, in the same context, details the consequences of that event as
follows:
And now, in the shadow of this flag, we resemble a people in self-alienation170 – in our
clothing, housing, eating, in our literature, in our printed media and – what is most
dangerous – in our culture. We raise people beholden to the West and, beholden to the
West, we seek solutions for every problem.171
and
[…] it is from that very time of constitutionalism that the [Shii] clergy […] who used to be
the last bulwark of resistance against the Westerner hid in their shell so much and closed
the door to the outside world in their own face so much and holed up in their cocoon so
much that, if ever, it will crack open on the Day of Resurrection.172
Taking note of Āl-e Aḥmad’s identification, in the penultimate quote, of
West infection with self-alienation, we may be allowed to feel reminded of
his characterization, in one of the earlier quotes, of West infected man as
‘inauthentic’.173 This suggests that Āl-e Aḥmad, when defining the dehuma-
nization of man under the spell of West infection, uses the terms ‘self-
alienation’, which can be traced back to the thought of Hegel and Marx,
and ‘inauthenticity’, which occurs as a keyword in existentialist philosophy,
in a somewhat similar sense. Now, far from attempting to classify Āl-e
Aḥmad as an existentialist in any doctrinal sense, we nonetheless cannot
help observing that the semantic rapprochement between ‘self-alienation’
and ‘inauthenticity’ takes place in post-world war II existentialist philoso-
phy in the context of trying, in the name of existentialist humanism, to
equate the two concepts with each other on account of the principal possi-
bility for man to live an inauthentic life.174 Finding this terminological
assimilation in Āl-e Aḥmad’s Ġarbzadegī, then, may be taken as an indica-
tion of some awareness, however unsystematic, of existentialism on the part
of the author. And, indeed, Āl-e Aḥmad is remembered by people close to
169 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 78. Cf. Dabashi 2008: 85; Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 78; Ḫalīlī 2005: 82.
170 Persian az ḫod bīgāne.
171 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 78.
172 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 77–78.
173 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 146.
174 Hügli/Lübcke 2005: 174a, 555a.
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him – some of whom, like Daryush Ashuri175 and Moḥammad-Taqī Ġiyāsī,176
dealt with his oeuvre as scholars, too – as interested in, or even influenced,
by Sartre.177 But, again, as we have remarked in our comment on a previous
quote, however much Āl-e Aḥmad may have known, or cared about, exis-
tentialist philosophy, his references to existentialist notions do not add up
to any underlying existentialist system.
Āl-e Aḥmad’s tribute to religion as reflected in the three previous quotes has
caused much confusion among many of his recipients given that the author, in
the very same essay in which he highlights the importance of Shii religion as the
hallmark of Iranian cultural identity, makes some very unflattering remarks
about the religious establishment of his day such as when he says:
[…] religion with all its institutions and conventions is grounding itself, as far as it can, in
superstition and sheltering in bygone times and in rotten and obsolete ways, resigning
itself to being a cemetery caretaker and thinking, in the 20th century, by the standards of
the Middle Ages.178
and
[…] not only did the clergy, in the face all that pressure [in the wake of 20th century
modernization measures by the Pahlavī regime], show nothing in terms of a reaction, but
kept concerning themselves with the minutiae of ritual prayer or the details of ritual purity
or impurity. […] and if indeed they put their best foot forward, they declared radio and
television a sin, regardless of the fact that these have spread so far and wide that no hero
can check them anyway.179
He does so, however, in order to remind the representatives of the religious
institution of what he regards as their real religious duty, namely, to stand up
against unjust and incompetent rulers:
Instead, the clergy, quite rightly and aptly, could and, indeed, should arm themselves with
the weapons of the enemy, countering the West infection of the official and semi-official
broadcasting stations with radio and television stations of their own, broadcasting from
[the holy cities of] Qom or Mašhad – just as the Vatican does. […] If the clergy only knew
what a precious seed in terms of a nucleus of any uprising against the rule of oppressors
and sinners, by virtue of their belief in the lawfulness of disobedience to those in power,
they have kept alive in the hearts of the people, if they could reveal the true nature of these
175 Ashuri 2000: 661–664.
176 Ġiyāsī 1988.
177 Ashuri 2000: 661–664; Boroujerdi 1996: 69–70.
178 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 107.
179 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 81–82. Cf. Ḫalīlī 2005: 73; Hanson 1983: 12; Hāšemī 2015: 165; Vahdat
2002: 121.
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rulers to the people by using their own media and apply the rule on general questions to
specific ones, and if they could give momentum to their cause by joining international
clerical institutions, they would never focus so much as they are doing now on trivial
issues that only result in mere ignorance of, and in isolation from, the depth of life.180
And as far as the clergy is concerned, it can be said that the seed of Āl-e
Aḥmad’s admonition fell on fertile ground.181 Even prior to, and independent
of, the publication of Ġarbzadegī, parts of Iran’s religious establishment had
come around to recognizing the need to assume opinion leadership in dealing
with ‘the West’ both at the theoretical and practical level and to play an active
part in Iran’s sociocultural development.182 It is in the wake of these efforts that
two eminent religious scholars of their time, Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabāʾī
(1903–1981)183 and Mortażā Moṭahharī (1920–1979),184 in their treatise The
Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism,185 undertook the first sys-
tematic attempt in Iran’s more recent intellectual history to subject the philoso-
phical doctrines they regarded as intellectual roots of Western modernity to a
critique in the light of what they defined as ‘Islamic’ philosophy.186 At the same
time and in the same context, scholarly exchange between the religious semin-
ary and secular institutions of learning was encouraged in order to bring each
side up to date on the intellectual tradition and the teaching subjects of the
other.187 At the more practical level, leading clerics, most prominently Āyatollāh
Ḫomeynī (1902–1989)188 in his book The Guardianship of the Jurist,189 reformed
religious legal thought and formulated new positions concerning the relation-
ship between religion and politics.190 Against this backdrop, Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay
proved to be an additional inspiration for the so-called clerical subculture, a
180 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 82. Cf. Boroujerdi 1996: 72–73, 75–76; Dabashi 2008: 74–88, 91–94;
Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 78–80; Gheissari 1998: 89–90; Ḫalīlī 2005: 73, 77, 82–83; Hanson
1983: 12; Hāšemī 2015: 165–166; Mirsepassi 2011: 121–122; Vahdat 2000: 66; Vahdat 2002: 121.
181 Boroujerdi 1996: 75–76; Dabashi 2008: 76–88.
182 Boroujerdi 1996: 80–83, 85–94; Dabashi 2008: 274–275, 278–279, 281–282, 284–285.
183 Dabashi 2008: 273–323.
184 Dabashi 2008: 147–215.
185 My translation of the Persian original Oṣūl-e falsafe va raveš-e reʾālīsm: Boroujerdi 1996: 88;
Dabashi 2008: 313–314.
186 Gösken 2014: 250–438; Seidel 2012: 143.
187 Boroujerdi 1996: 90–94, 131–136; Halm 2005: 94–99.
188 Dabashi 2008: 409–484; Halm 2005: 100–106.
189 My translation of the Persian original Velāyat-e faqīh: Boroujerdi 1996: 84–85, 96; Dabashi
2008: 491–493; Halm 1988: 160–166; Halm 2005: 102–106.
190 Boroujerdi 1996: 81–82; Lambton 1964.
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term denoting the clerical variety of the counter culture against the official
sociocultural discourse and practice promoted by the Pahlavī state.191
There are scholars of twentieth century Iranian intellectual history who
see in Āl-e Aḥmad’s identification of Iranian cultural identity with religion a
reflection of his biography, noting a ‘return’ to religion of the author in the
final stage of his life.192 And it is true that Āl-e Aḥmad had been born to a
religious family and that his father, a cleric, had sent him to the holy city of
Naǧaf in Iraq, a center of Shii religious learning.193 Āl-e Aḥmad, however,
after staying in Naǧaf for no longer than a few months, returned to Iran in
order to pursue – without his father’s knowledge – a secular education,194
and his ideological orientation until the 1960s is marked by secular, for many
years even communist, tendencies.195 His heightened emphasis on religion –
besides what he has to say about the subject in Ġarbzadegī – is manifest in
his literary production in the 1960s, most notably Lost in the Crowd from
1965, his edited notes on his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964.196 From what
becomes apparent from the essay Ġarbzadegī, however, the religion Āl-e
Aḥmad turns to in the 1960s is not to be conceived in terms of convention
or tradition – let alone institutionalized tradition – into which man is born,
but rather as the result and the manifestation of an existential choice in the
name of the question concerning the possibility for human being of being
human. ‘Religion’ in the sense in which Āl-e Aḥmad understands it in his
essay, then, is not ‘religion’ in the sense his father presumably understood it
and wanted his son to understand it. Neither does Āl-e Aḥmad – as many
reformist thinkers had done – perceive religion as a discourse that, at best,
had to conform to modernist rationalist discourse and, if judged unfit to do
so, had to be dropped, but values it as a discourse and as a mode
of existence in their own right. Viewed from this angle, Āl-e Aḥmad’s intel-
lectual development in the 1960s cannot be rightfully called a ‘return’ to
religion – no more than his remarks, in Ġarbzadegī, about Iran’s cultural
tradition can be understood as advocating a ‘return’ to Iran’s pre-industrial
past. It is the understanding of religion as an existential choice, in the way it
191 Boroujerdi 1996: 77–98.
192 Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 76–77; Ḫalīlī 2005: 77–78.
193 Boroujerdi 1996: 65; Hanson 1983: 7; Dabashi 2008: 42–45; Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 1,
1985: 745a; Gheissari 1998: 88; Vahdat 2002: 113.
194 Boroujerdi 1996: 65; Dabashi 2008: 45; Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 1, 1985: 745a; Gheissari
1998: 88.
195 Boroujerdi 1996: 65–66; Dabashi 2008: 45–50; Encyclopaedia Iranica, vol. 1, 1985: 745b.
196 One of the conventional translations of the original Persian Ḫasī dar mīqāt: Dabashi 2008:
71–72; Ǧamšīdī/Īrān-nežād 2012: 77; Ḫalīlī 2005: 78.
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is detectable in Āl-e Aḥmad’s essay, that came to be adopted by a number of
Iranian intellectuals – perhaps most conspicuously the sociologist and ideo-
logue ʿAlī Šarīʿatī (1933–1977)197 –, many of whom are considered as having
paved the way for the 1979 revolution or even took part in it. That the
understanding of religion apparent in Ġarbzadegī contributed to shaping
the course and the discourse of a revolutionary movement aiming at over-
throwing a regime that was itself widely perceived as an agent of West
infection, against this background, comes as no surprise: For it is the under-
standing of religion as an existential choice that had the potential to trans-
form religion from a ‘tradition’ expected to be overcome by ‘Western’
modernity into a force expected to overcome, in its turn, Western modernity.
Conclusion
Āl-e Aḥmad’s Ġarbzadegī can be argued with good reason to constitute the
single most important contribution to shifting the paradigm of the sociocultural
discourse of Iranian intellectuals from being – until the late 1950s – a mainly
developmentalist discourse to focusing on identity and authenticity, two issues
which have remained dominant themes ever since. Speaking of authenticity, we
consider it safe to say that Āl-e Aḥmad, in bringing up this concept, drew
inspiration from existentialism. At the same time, we do not feel compelled to
regard him as a systematic follower of existentialist philosophy in order to be
able to meaningfully interpret his essay or to account for its deep and lasting
impact. After all, Āl-e Aḥmad himself, although reportedly interested in Sartre
and acquainted with Aḥmad Fardīd, never claimed to be a philosopher in his
discourse. But it may well be this very non-commitment of the author to any
particular philosophical doctrine which contributed to his essay’s lasting effect.
For by bringing up the issue of authenticity, while not appropriating it himself
in the light of any given philosophy, Āl-e Aḥmad left all options open for other
intellectuals to develop it further. And many of those other intellectuals
who have been – or still are – developing it further can clearly be identified
as followers of existentialist philosophy. To quote but a few examples,
we may mention the philosopher and political scientist Daryush Shayegan
(1935–2018),198 who, in his analysis of Iran’s sociocultural situation vis-à-vis
197 Boroujerdi 1996: 105–115; Branson 1983: 13–18; Dabashi 2008: 102–146; Gheissari 1998: 97–
107; Vahdat 2002: 135–153.
198 Boroujerdi 1996: 147–155; Mirsepassi 2011: 34–38.
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the West, until the 1980s adopted and adapted many points of Heidegger’s
concept of the history of beyng199 and who, like Āl-e Aḥmad, regarded Shii
religion as Iranians’ primordial source of identity.200 Another representative of
existentialism-inspired Iranian authenticity discourse is the philosopher Reżā
Dāvarī Ardakānī (1933-), who, very much on the basis of his appropriation of
Heidegger’s history of beyng, constructs an ontological East-West dichotomy.201
Apart from these philosophers, we may again name ʿAlī Šarīʿatī, who, appro-
priating Sartrean existentialism and Marxism, in the name of a ‘return to self’
took the step from defining Iranian identity as Shii Islam, as Āl-e Aḥmad had
done, to defining Shii Islam as a revolutionary doctrine and practice expected to
defend Iranian identity against Western imperialism.202
But Āl-e Aḥmad’s significance for these and other intellectuals does not lie in
whatever influence on his Ġarbzadegī of existentialism with its stress on authen-
ticity and the question of meaning interpreters may feel justified to attribute to
this text. It may rather be seen in that Āl-e Aḥmad in his essay challenges the
developmentalist ideals so fervently promoted by Iranian policy makers and
intellectuals under the spell of their belief in technological rationality’s promise
of salvation by throwing into their face a seemingly simple question: ‘So, what’s
the point?’ Āl-e Aḥmad, in his essay, rhetorically asks this question when describ-
ing his reaction to media reports praising the latest achievements in space
technology that, as Āl-e Aḥmad phrases it, have not only made it possible for
man to travel to outer space, but also to reproduce there. Instead of being duly
impressed, Āl-e Aḥmad comments on this news with the words:
This only goes to show that humanity has been ridiculed. ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘scientism’,
then, have become so advanced that two human beings are being made the object of tough
experiments followed by insemination and then by reproduction and … So, what’s the
point?203
And, replying to his rhetorical question with an equally rhetorical answer, the
author goes on:
The point is to prove that man can live and reproduce outside the earth’s atmosphere. But
then again – what’s the point? 204
199 Boroujerdi 1996: 150–152; Mirsepassi 2011: 34–35.
200 Boroujerdi 1996: 152–153; Mirsepassi 2011: 35–37.
201 Boroujerdi 1996: 159–165.
202 Boroujerdi 1996: 105–115; Dabashi 2008: 109–122, 125–144; Gheissari 1998: 97–108; Lenze
2008: 177; Mirsepassi 2011: 124–128.
203 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 212.
204 Āl-e Aḥmad 1964: 212.
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This question of Āl-e Aḥmad’s is clearly a question about meaning. But in
order to make sense of it, we need not feel compelled to understand it as a
question about meaning in terms of existentialism. Rather, we may be allowed
to take Āl-e Aḥmad’s argument implied in his question further by interpreting it
as an antithesis to the belief in technological modernity being the answer to
Iran’s sociocultural situation. For, being appropriated by technological moder-
nization and reduced to a mere object of the machine, human being does not
matter, being deprived, as it is, of its identity as a human being and, hence, of
any option of being human. But for a human being that does not matter since it
does not exist anymore as a human being, technological modernization, which,
after all, claims to be for the good of man, naturally cannot matter either. So,
indeed – what’s the point?
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